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The Agricultural Act of 1949 pro
vided for the indirect support of the
price of manufacturing milk at prices
ranging from 75 to 90% of parity. The
Act was amended in 1977, and again in
1979, to establish a minimum support
price of 80% of parity through September
of 1981. Prices are indirectly support
ed by the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) through the purchase of carload
lots of butter, cheese and non-fat dry
milk.
As a result of higher prices for
manufacturing milk, USDA net market
purchases rose from less than 1% of
total production in 1978-79 to 6.4% in
'79-'80 and 9.6% in '80-'81. Purchases
in 1982 have continued the upward climb
to about 10.5% of milk production, and
will continue to increase in 1983 if no
change is made in the program. We are
producing nearly 15% more milk annually
than we can consume. Since 1975 there
has been a corresponding increase in
program costs, with the present annual
cost estimated to be 2.5 billion
dollars.
In spite of increased donations.to
the school lunch program, cheese "give
away" programs, and increased foreign
and domestic sales, government stocks
have grown. This is because of increases
both in dairy cow numbers and production
per cow. As of May 6, 1983 CCC has in
storage 456 million lbs of butter (up
15% from a year earlier), 778 million
lbs of cheese (up 24%) and 1.2 billion
lbs. of non-fat dry milk (up 22%).
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1982 Legislation
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1982 contains features designed
to reduce the cost of the dairy price
support program. Under this law the
minimum level of support for the mar
keting years 1982 and 1983 is set at
$13.10 per cwt for Grade A milk used in
manufacturing. For 1984 the minimum
support level will be the level of par
ity represented by $13.10 on October 1,
1983.
Another feature of the Act autho
rizes the Secretary of Agriculture to
deduct 50 cents per cwt from dairy
farmers' receipts if the net price sup
port purchases for the marketing year
exceed 5 billion pounds of milk equiva
lent. The Act authorizes a second 50
cent assessment on or after April 1,
1983 (until Sept. 30, 1985) if net sup
port purchases exceed 7.5 billion pounds
of milk equivalent.
Secretary Block attempted to imple
ment the first 50 cent assessment in
December 1982 and again on April 16.
Both attempts were blocked by court
action brought about by dairy groups on
the grounds that proper procedures were
not followed in the implementation pro
cess. The way has now been cleared,
however, for the first assessment to be
levied.
Why all the fuss over a 50 cent
assessment? Depending upon the, local
milk price, which varies from one area
of the country to another and fluctuates
from week to week within any given area,
the 50 cent deduction amounts to about a
4% reduction in milk price. While this
may appear to be a minor loss, it repre
sents (according to John Maher, Area
Extension Farm Management Specialist) a
drop in net dairy income for the Class
III milk producer of about 9 to 11%,
depending upon the size of the capital
investment.
If the second 50 cent assessment is
put into effect, the net income of the
South Dakota dairy producer would be
reduced somevfliere in a range between 17
and 22%.
Faced with these kind of losses,
there is speculation that many pro
ducers, in an attempt to keep their
income at present levels, will increase
their,production. If they do, the sur
plus dairy products problem will be
further aggravated, rather than al
leviated as intended in the legislation.
Alternatives Being Considered
Secretary Block, when announcing
the imposition of the first 50 cent
assessment, said he would delay imple
menting the second Congressionally-
authorized 50 cent assessment until
August 1 to give Congress time to adopt
more effective legislation. The assess
ment program is viewed by everyone as a
stop-gap measure to be used until sane-
thing more permanent can be hammered
out.
Several proposals for a major over
haul of the program are under consider
ation. They include a two-price system,
a quota system, a price incentive pro
gram, a reduction in the level of price
supports, and a possible expansion of
dairy product exports. None of these
proposals is totally new.
The two-price systen is not unlike
the present program. While the mechanics
of the program may differ among pro
ponents, the basics are the same. The
Comnodity Credit Corporation would con
tinue to support a high milk price
through market purchases. But unlike in
the present program, products purchased
over needs for school lunch and welfare
would be sold abroad at world prices.
Losses incurred from foreign sales would
be pro-rated back to the dairy producers
in the form of an assessment based upon
the ratios of total product sold in the
domestic market versus in the world
market. The end price to the producer
would be a blend between the' domestic
and world prices.
Critics of the proposal oppose it
for at least two reasons. The U.S. has
a comparative advantage in the produc
tion of many agricultural products. We
have been long-time proponents of free
trade in the world market place and have
been critical of nations that practice
protectionism and subsidized sales, such
as the European Common Market. Such a
program for dairy would weaken our bar
gaining position on other agricultural
export policy agreements.
The second argument is that the
recipient of the "bargain basement"
sales of dairy products would most
likely be the Communist Bloc nations.
Dairy producers in the rest of the world
would not welcome our imports anymore
than our Ag producers welcome imports,
whether they be cheese, meat, grains or
wool. Such a program could set off a
trade war among food exporting coun
tries.
The quota systen proposal is quite
similar to the present tobacco price
support program. Producers would be
assigned a base equal to milk production
in some recent period. A quota would be
calculated from this base so as to
assure that if only quota milk were
produced all would sell in the domestic
market. If a producer sold more than the
quota, he would receive only the world
price for over-quota milk. Because of
the disincentive to produce more than
the quota, the problsn of surpluses and
subsidized sales on the world market
would be alleviated.
One problem with a quota system is
that program benefits soon become capi
talized into the value of the quotas.
Our experience with the tooacco program
testifies to this fact. Quotas assigned
to tobacco farmers nearly 50 years ago
have been passed on to their heirs, who
no longer raise tobacco but lease their
quota to tobacco growers. The General
Accounting Office recently estimated
that only about 26% of the present
growers produce tobacco on their own
quotas. The other 74% must lease quotas
from non-growers, with the result that
many of the program benefits are reaped
by non-farmers.
Just as with the tobacco program, a
fledgling farmer would have little op
portunity to enter into dairy, and re
cent entrants into dairy might not be
assigned a base if they were not pro
ducing during the base period. This
could very well spell bankruptcy for
many such producers.
The price incentive program,
favored by the National Milk Producer
Federation, is a variation of the quota
system. Under this scheme the govern
ment would pay $10 per cwt by which
dairymen cut their production from 1983
production levels, up to 30%. In effect,
the 1983 production level would be the
quota in future years.
The same problems with the pre
viously mentioned quota system would
apply to this program, except there
would not be any barrier to new pro
ducers who could sell at the support
price. There might also be the familiar
"fhee rider" problon. Producers vAio
chose not to go into the program could
maintain, or even increase their produc
tion to any level and still receive the
support price.
Another possibility is a cut in the
present price support level. The
American Farm Bureau has proposed
lowering the present minimum to as low
as $11.32 per cwt. Spokesmen for USDA
have indicated the agency would support
a one dollar cut.
A $1 cut in price support level and
a $1 assessment may appear to be the
same thing. The effects on consumers and
taxpayers, however, would likely be
quite different even though Class III
dairy producers' incomes would be re
duced about the same in either case.
If the price support level is
reduced by one dollar, presumably the
consumer would pay about 7.5% less for
milk and the storage cost to government
would be reduced by about 7.5%. If a
one dollar assessment is imposed, the
consumer would pay about the same market
price for milk. The Federal Government
would receive the assessment revenue,
which would be used to help pay the cost
of the program.
A fifth alternative is to try to
increase export possibilities. The Euro
pean Economic Community (Common Market
countries), which heavily subsidizes
agricultural product exports, is having
surplus dairy product problems too. In
spite of increased subsidy levels, their
butter and non-fat dry milk stocks are
even greater than ours.
U.S. dairy products are difficult
to, market through international trade
channels because of differing market
grades and packaging standards. Most of
our surplus butter is packaged in 64-68
lb boxes. It is also a salted product of
80% butterfat content. International
butter market standards are based on an
unsalted 82% butterfat product packaged
in 250 or 500 gram packages.
Nearly all of our CCC inventory of
non-fat dry milk is unfortified and of
questionable use for anything other than
recombination or animal feed.
About 60% of CCC stocks of cheese
is held in 500 lb barrels which, before
consumption, must be broken down into
consumer sized processed cheese loaves.
Another 30% of the stocks in storage is
in 40-60 lb blocks of cheddar, which
again is unsuitable for the interna
tional market.
The only market for our cheddar
cheese is in those countries that are
former members of the British Common
wealth, many of which have surplus dairy
product problens too. People of the rest
of the world do not eat cheddar.
Even if we changed our product
standards to meet world market
standards, we could not profitably re
duce our dairy product surpluses. World
market prices are too low. To signi
ficantly increase our market share,
would require large subsidies of export
sales at taxpayer expense.
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